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What’s wrong with happiness? 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
This article is a contribution to the debate on the questionable connections between 
economic growth and enhanced happiness among populations in already-affluent 
societies.1 I will first review current discussion of these questions - debate about 
which arises in part from the existence of separate measures of public happiness and 
income levels. I will then discuss whether increased ‘happiness’, with its 
philosophical origins in utilitarianism, is the best way of framing the idea of the good 
for individuals and societies - suggesting that it is at any rate insufficient for this 
purpose. Finally, I will focus on the way in which Richard Layard has framed these 
questions, and in particular on the way in which he addresses the problems of mental 
health in this context, by means of his proposal for a large-scale programme of 
cognitive behaviour therapy.  
 
Happiness and wealth 
Societies like ours are getting richer, but are they getting any happier? This is now 
becoming a major topic of debate, with a growing literature. It is argued that the 
connection long assumed to exist between increased affluence and happiness or 
‘subjective well-being’ is actually weak for countries above a fairly basic level of 
prosperity - defined at an annual average gross national product of around $15,000 or 
$20,000 dollars per head of population. Since many governments in rich countries 
make continuing economic growth their primary political goal, the evidence that this 
does not lead to improvements in people’s well-being is, or should be, a serious 
matter for public policy. 
 
There have been many studies of self-reported happiness, or subjective well being, in 
different countries, from 1950 onward; and nation-by-nation comparisons show only a 
small correlation between income levels and self-reported well-being, once countries 
reach the GNP level mentioned above. Countries where average per capita income is 
between $20,000 and $35,000 have satisfaction rates only a few percentage points 
above a whole range of countries where income is below $10,000 (see Richard 
Layard, Happiness, p32). Though the lowest satisfaction rates are in the poorer 
countries, a number of nations where average income is under $10,000 have average 
happiness levels close to those of much richer countries.   
 
Furthermore, in the period in which the latter has been systematically measured, 
improvements in living standards in nations such as the United States and Britain are 
associated with no improvement - indeed slight decline - in subjective well-being. 
One US study found that between 1972 and 1994, a time when income increased 
massively, the percentage of the population reporting themselves to be ‘very happy’ 
fell by four percentage points (from just over 34% to just over 30% - see Robert 
Lane’s The Loss of Happiness, p20). Generally, in the United States, self-reported 
happiness has declined in the postwar period. The rich invariably report themselves in 
surveys to be happier than the poor (just as they enjoy better health and longer life-
expectancy). But their self-reported degree of happiness does not increase over time 
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even though their absolute level of wealth has greatly increased over the past decades 
(see Happiness, p30; The Loss of Happiness, p5). 
  
Other kinds of evidence support these findings. Crime levels greatly increased during 
the period of the most rapid rise in prosperity (and, counter-intuitively, of full 
employment too, which one might have expected to reduce crime levels). Family 
breakdown, measured in divorce rates and the incidence of single-parent families, also 
increased markedly, though there has been some stabilisation in both in the last 
decade or so. Mental illness has increased, to the point that Richard Layard has 
identified it as one of the major problems facing governments. All does not seem to be 
well.2 Why not? 
 
Defining the problem 
Why might there be a weak or even inverse relationship between economic growth 
and happiness? One reason is what is called the adaptation effect. Improvements in 
living standards - higher income, more goods and services, more travel - lead us 
continually to upgrade our view of what we need. The satisfaction we gain from our 
large television set is eroded by the appearance of high definition television; in our 
new car by the superior models that every year come on to the market. We find 
ourselves on what is described as an hedonic treadmill, which keeps us working and 
accumulating, but only in order to stay in the same place as far as our actual 
satisfaction is concerned.  
 
A second reason emerges from critiques of the assumptions of the neo-classical 
economic paradigm that has been so influential in shaping our modern economic 
system. The idea here is that increased wealth has diminishing marginal utility, in 
relation to other goods that have to be foregone in order to achieve it. Any good, in 
economic theory, becomes relatively less valuable, relative to other goods, as it 
becomes more abundant. An additional unit of wealth in an affluent society will thus 
be experienced as of less value than the goods that have to be foregone to obtain it. If 
rising incomes are achieved only at the cost of - in Robert Lane’s terms - less 
companionship, or less time spent with our children, partners or friends, or doing the 
things that we most enjoy, then it is no surprise if we do not feel happier for being 
richer, and perhaps less happy. 
 
A third reason, set out by Richard Layard in his book Happiness, concerns rivalry, or 
what sociologists used to call ‘relative deprivation’. We measure our well-being not 
only by reference to our own past situation, but also by the situation of others, within 
our reference group. If other people have more, we feel that we have less. The sense 
of improvement or otherwise is relative, so if we are no better off relative to others, 
we may feel no improvement in our well-being even if our absolute purchasing power 
increases. (Experiments testing people’s attitudes to hypothetical changes in their own 
and others’ income have shown that people’s sense of well-being is lessened by 
imagining that others are doing better, even if their own absolute situation is 
unchanged.) I remember when I used to have management responsibility for a Faculty 
in a university, recognising that the opportunity that the university sometimes gave for 
staff to compete for promotion would very likely be the source of misery rather than 
pleasure, since more people would end up unpromoted than promoted, and rivalries 
would be increased by the competition.  
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Degrees of inequality also influence subjective well-being. Country-by-country 
comparisons show that more equal societies, such as the Scandinavian countries, have 
higher levels of reported happiness than more unequal ones, such as the United States 
or Britain. This finding adds to what has previously been established in the sphere of 
health and illness (where Richard Wilkinson has found that more equal societies are 
on average healthier, and that the steeper the hierarchy of distribution of income and 
wealth, the worse the average health of those occupying inferior positions). Country-
by-country comparisons also show a lower incidence of ‘social diseases’, such as 
crime and addiction, within more equal societies. This may be a consequence of the 
fact that in maintaining a more equal distribution of wealth and income, those 
societies are manifesting respect and concern for all, especially the less well-off, as 
well as of the fact that a sufficiency of goods and services (health care, education and 
housing for all, for example) gives rise to greater aggregate satisfaction than would a 
greater abundance of goods available to the rich alone.  
 
Critics of economic growth as the overriding objective of governments argue that it 
produces disbenefits that outweigh its material gains. Thus, if geographical mobility 
increases, job security is reduced, and social solidarity, especially in the form of 
family ties, grows weaker; people will then lose more than they gain from higher 
income - in ‘goods’ that they value but which are undervalued by the market. If 
subjective well-being, as Robert E Lane argues, is enhanced most by feelings of being 
respected and accorded recognition, then social processes which undermine these 
conditions will make us feel worse, even if we have a larger salary to spend each year.  
 
There is a further paradox. The equation of the true wealth of a community with the 
economic statistics which measure this wealth, is misleading. A great deal of ‘value’ 
(in terms of what gives satisfaction) is generated outside the sphere of market 
exchange. The ‘goods’ generated by many activities within the home (cooking meals, 
playing with the children, having a conversation, entertaining friends) are invisible in 
the national accounts, except to the degree that they entail expenditures to sustain 
them. It has been calculated (though estimates of this differ) that national income as it 
is measured in the market sphere accounts for less than half of true ‘national wealth’, 
if one also assigns a notional monetary value to non-marketised activities.  
 
Parents who stay at home two days a week to look after their young children, instead 
of doing paid work, are reducing their own and the ‘national income’ by so doing, 
even if the benefit to them and the children is greater than that which would be 
brought by two days’ extra earnings. In the terms of the money economy they will be 
poorer, but in terms of their psychic, relational and social economy, they may be 
richer, and their children even more so.  
 
Robert Lane points to another mismatch between measures of welfare generated by 
the market and actual benefit, within the sphere of paid work itself. In neo-classical 
economic theory, work is seen as something whose disbenefits have to be 
compensated by wages and salaries. (In another words it is treated as a cost, not a 
benefit; its value is measured solely by the payments made in return for it.) This 
ignores the intrinsic benefits which arise from work itself, from the enjoyment of 
human faculties, from its sense of achievement, and from the relations with others 
which it involves. These benefits go unmeasured in calculations of Gross National 
Product. It is thus quite possible that the marketable wealth that may be generated by 
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some ‘efficiency gains’ in work practices may be more than offset by the losses to 
well-being in the activity of work itself. Some intrinsic goods in the experience of 
consumption are also undervalued by the market. Thus people may enjoy better value 
from lower prices when they shop at out-of-town supermarkets, but lose value from 
the friendly contact they formerly enjoyed with local shopkeepers and neighbours, or 
from the decline of the quality of the urban environment. Such losses of well-being 
are more severe for those who do not have resources to make use of more distant 
shopping places.  
 
The continuing increases in national wealth of recent years have been achieved in part 
through the expansion of the sphere of monetised exchange (though technological and 
organisational advances are also factors). More ready-prepared meals are bought and 
consumed; more people eat out, there are more families in which both parents take 
paid work, more caring of various kinds is done by paid staff. Gift-exchange, which 
Karl Polanyi thought central to pre-capitalist economies, is diminished, especially 
within Britain and the USA, while that economy of market exchange expands.3 And 
we ‘import’ migrants from other countries, to sustain our own ‘economic growth’. 
(For the migrants themselves, the shift from a world of informal or gift exchange to 
marketised relationships is even more marked.4) 
 
These factors help us to understand why there may be a negative rather than positive 
correlation between the gradient of rising material wealth and that of subjective well-
being. The emergence of doubts of this kind in public debate may now be starting to 
have political resonance. Also relevant to these doubts about the benefits of increased 
wealth are anxieties about climate change, and the wider problems of resource 
scarcity that are likely to come from the further industrialisation of countries such as 
China and India. The lifting-out of poverty of millions of people is wholly to be 
welcomed, but as large sections of these populations begin to aspire to the same levels 
of consumption as Americans and Europeans, it is indeed high time that we asked 
some questions about the desirability and sustainability of giving priority to economic 
growth in the nations of the west that are already rich.  
 
What drives this system?  
Since many people feel overstressed by the demands of the market economy, and to a 
degree recognise the unhappiness to which it gives rise, it is a problem to understand 
why its dynamic seems so irresistible. Why do governments give such priority to 
‘economic growth’, and take such pride in its achievement, when it seems clear that 
its benefits in an improved ‘quality of life’ are so limited? What are the primary 
drivers of a system that gives such priority to the accumulation of wealth?  
 
One should first note that most people are employed by hierarchical organisations, in 
which in return for the opportunity to work, receive pay and maybe some economic 
security, they are required to do as they told. This is the case whether organisations 
are private or public. So if organisations are driven by the will to make profits, or to 
balance their budgets, it will be difficult for their members to give priority to other 
goods, except informally, or in such space as an organisation decides to concede to 
them. Organisations in the market sector are driven by the necessity to make profits, 
and those who own their capital, and their senior managers, are dedicated to these 
purposes. It seems likely that the CEOs of large companies are not motivated so much 
by the desire to enhance their capacity to spend or to consume more, but rather by 
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their ‘competitive instincts’ – their desire to succeed, have high status in their own 
social world and to exercise power (their income and wealth are so substantial, and 
their leisure is so constrained, that consumption can hardly be the primary goal for 
them). As Schumpeter well understood, a capitalist system is driven by entrepreneurs 
with strong wills and competitive drives.5  
 
Public bureaucracies have in the past been less single-minded in their goals than 
organisations operating in the market. They have often given more scope than market-
based organisations to other values. This has often been seen as rendering public 
sector organisations less ‘efficient’ - in terms of the cost of the goods and services 
they provide, than those operating in the market, and this has been a justification for 
privatisation and for creating ‘internal markets’ within them. But accompanying this 
greater economic ‘efficiency’ has been more single-mindedness, a determined 
privileging of the goal of cost-effectiveness over competing values. This is seen as 
giving priority to the needs of consumers, over those of producers, and is reflected in 
pressures on the workforce, which often reduce their autonomy or job security. They 
may be encouraged to concentrate not on their own conception of a ‘job well done’, 
but on making sure that the ‘cost-centre’ to which they are attached meets its financial 
targets.  
 
There are plainly some benefits to be derived from giving priority to consumers over 
producers (though with the qualifications that most citizens are employees as well as 
consumers, and that the ‘goods’ of lower prices and greater consumer choice may be 
accompanied by ‘bads’ such as the experience of reduced security in their workplace). 
But a single-minded concentration on economic efficiency does not always 
necessarily benefit consumers - for example where the pleasures of consumption 
include relationships with providers which become attenuated in the pursuit of 
efficiency. The ‘impersonalisation’ of the provision of goods and services is a 
widespread phenomenon, as anyone who phones a call-centre well knows. Thus many 
employed individuals are compelled by their conditions of employment to give their 
priority to income-maximising goals, for their employers, at the expense of other 
values.  
 
A second important driver of the priority given to market values - at individual, 
organisational and governmental levels - is economic anxiety. It is not just that 
profitability and economic growth are deemed good in themselves, but there is fear 
that if a company, institution or nation falls behind in the competitive race, harmful 
consequences will necessarily follow. Global competition, as our government never 
ceases to remind us, is a serious worry. One might imagine that if one settled for less 
than our ‘trend rate’ of economic growth, we could then give more priority to 
different goals, such as greater security, a more equal society, more fulfilling work, a 
more participatory public life, more creative leisure. But in fact any ‘slackening off’ 
of economic competitiveness is feared to bring the risk of real economic decline, 
which could then bring unemployment, impoverishment and social resentment. While 
improvements in material standards may bring little apparent improvement in 
happiness, there does seem reason to fear that a significant deterioration in these 
would have damaging social consequences.  
 
Our government in Britain is in any case committed to ‘enrichment’ as a good in 
itself, and has conspicuously allied itself to those its leaders deem to be the major 
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‘wealth creators’ in society. But it is also motivated by these anxieties about 
competitiveness, theorised for it by sociologists such as Anthony Giddens in the ideas 
of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘risk society’. Thus the education system is remodelled to 
enhance standards of performance (rather than the happiness and creativity of 
children) in order that those leaving school will be more employable. Economic 
efficiency is defined as the overriding objective of public sector organisations (such as 
NHS Trusts or universities), even at the expense of their primary purposes, on 
grounds that continued national economic competitiveness depends on it. Of course 
there are good reasons for deploying scarce human resources for the greatest benefit, 
but the measures used to effect these equations are often perverse in their effects. For 
example, it may be more ‘efficient’ to have no university class with less than fifteen 
students in it, but there is will usually be a loss of intensity and quality of learning in 
groups as large as this.  
 
The idea that a capitalist economy forces all those within its power to compete to the 
utmost, not because they necessarily wish to do so, but because they risk being 
destroyed by their competitors if they don’t, was formulated by Marx, for example in 
his 1848 pamphlet Wage Labour and Capital.6 This imperative has always coexisted 
with other values in society - for example the economy of gift exchange within 
families - but in the present era of a dominant global capitalist economy, this 
economic pressure on everyone is greater than ever, on nearly everyone.7 
 
The consequence is that although one can see that individual and social well-being are 
(in industrially developed countries) by no means closely correlated with rates of 
economic growth, there are great difficulties in de-coupling these two definitions of 
the good. The major institutions which control economic resources, and which 
employ most citizens, are designed and legally sanctioned to pursue profit above all 
other purposes. These organisations also shape a system of mass communications that 
systemically defines the good in terms what can be purchased and consumed in the 
market-place, for their own advantage.8 
 
Avner Offer’s fine book, The Challenge of Affluence (see note 1) adds further 
dimensions to this analysis. He identifies an increasing disequilibrium since the 1950s 
between people’s aspirations, continually over-stimulated within an individualist 
consumer society, and their actual satisfaction. He sees the consequence to be a 
prevailing ‘short-termism’ of choices, taken without understanding of longer-term 
costs, and in particular without to costs to others. The epidemics of obesity and 
addiction are one symptom of this - the consequence of the dislocation of 
consumption from the social relationships which give it meaning. The decline of 
family solidarity, and the increasing numbers of individuals experiencing divorce or 
separation, and of children thereby deprived of the care of two parents, is another 
instance. Offer argues that the advertising industry contributes not only to this climate 
of hyper-stimulation, but also to a deeper debasement of the media of public 
communication. He describes a kind of contamination of the sacred, in the way in 
which audiences are continually invited to believe in, and be moved by, images and 
persons which they know to be fundamentally dishonest. Social trust is thereby 
diminished. This argument is an eloquent restatement of Durkheim’s sociological 
critique of anomic and egoistic forms of solidarity, in which the necessary social and 
moral containment of human aspirations and desires is made weak.  
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Another dimension of this argument is set out in Stefano Zamagni’s essay on 
happiness and individualism in Economics and Happiness (see note 1 for details). 
Zamagni argues that the neo-classical economic paradigm of interest-maximising 
individuals has made it impossible to see that most satisfactions are found in contexts 
of relationship, such that an individual’s well-being cannot be separated from the 
well-being of those to whom they are relationally connected. For example, the well-
being of parents is connected to the well-being of children, of teachers to that of their 
pupils, of artists to the audiences who enjoy what they create. The necessary social 
dimensions of well-being, and their location in different possible ways of life, are 
neglected by models which privilege individual satisfactions and the economic 
transactions by which these are supposed to be secured.  
 
Governments usually do represent intrinsic claims of value, as well as those signified 
by the exchange values of the market. This is partly through their historical 
embodiment of societal goods (e.g. those signified by ‘the nation’ or aspects of its 
heritage), and partly because they are elected to give effect to collective social 
purposes, such as greater social justice. But while our governments do give effect to 
such social choices through law and taxation, and through mostly feeble attempts to 
articulate some vision of social possibility, they have in recent decades chosen to 
make economic growth their overriding commitment. No-one in government seems to 
feel at this point that it is politically safe to ask whether this priority should become 
something to be openly debated rather than taken for granted.  
 
Current doubts about the validity of economic growth as a measure of well-being 
have a history. In the 1970s Amartya Sen was influential in his critique of the global 
outcomes of market-led economic policies, and measures of economic improvement 
were instituted that were different from those of GNP or GNP per capita. The Human 
Development Index produced each year by the United Nations has been one valuable 
outcome of this critique. This sets out indices of well-being, including such 
dimensions as infant mortality, mortality and fertility rates, clean water supply and 
sanitation, education (not least for girls) - which give measures of improvement more 
discriminating, egalitarian and public-spirited than crude GNP calculations. These 
ways of thinking have had some considerable influence, including on the British 
government. 
 
Domestically, the UK government attempts to measure social improvement by social 
indicators of these kinds. The public sector culture of targets and indicators in part 
reflects the idea that specific measures of well-being (health or educational outcomes 
for example) can be given genuine substance, and can stand with the rate of economic 
growth as a criterion of governmental and national success. However, such measures 
have often been diverted in their effects by being used as proxies for market 
indicators, instead of as substitutes for or alternatives to them, and as coercive 
instruments of marketisation. Levels of ‘educational performance’, or ‘health 
performance’ can be defined as the measures of quality of a product, to be chosen in 
competition by consumers just like any other product in the market place. These 
measurements of output are thus utilised not to help achieve acceptable standards for 
all, but for the manufacture of a quasi-market, in which both producers and consumers 
must compete with one another in their own self-interest. There is present somewhere 
in this frame the common goal of ensuring that absolute standards are raised by these 
indicators, and an acknowledgement of the relevance of social goals (literacy, health 
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etc) of some kinds. And in a governmental climate which was more genuinely 
democratic and pluralist in its capacity to sustain a debate about social priorities, 
indicators of well-being of these kinds could become resources for making genuine 
public choices. However, in the last ten years they have become the means by which 
governments impose the disciplines of competitive markets on both the providers and 
users of public services. 
 
The debate about economic growth and happiness has allowed more attention to be 
given to questions about what should be the objectives of government - and the goals 
of society - in addition to, or other than, the pursuit of ‘economic growth’. It also 
suggests that we should be exploring the consequences, both positive and negative, of 
settling for a desired rate of economic growth that is deliberately lower than the 
maximum feasible, in order to make space for other social goods.9 
 
The idea of happiness 
Among the most influential critiques of the equation of rising income levels with 
improved well-being have been economists (like Amartya Sen) and philosophers (like 
Martha Nussbaum) who have rejected the utilitarian concept of ‘the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number’ as an adequate criterion of the social good.10 They 
have argued that the idea of a single measure of welfare, equated with the satisfaction 
of desires or preferences, does not adequately recognise the diversity of human ends, 
and the need for freedom to deliberate and decide between them. They have instead 
defended an Aristotelian conception of happiness as, in Nussbaum’s term, ‘human 
flourishing’, or in Amartya Sen’s, the development of human capacities, as providing 
a more illuminating language for the framing of human ends.  
 
These critics of utilitarianism believe that the neo-classical economists’ equation of 
preferences and the ‘utility’ they signify with the happiness of subjects is too one-
dimensional and simplistic to provide the language of social choices that is needed. 
While fully accepting the necessity for markets to allocate goods and resources, Sen 
has insisted that democratic deliberation and the power of governments are also 
essential to secure well-being and give effect to people’s preferences.11 Among the 
arguments against the equation of happiness with utility are the problems that a 
hedonistic theory of motivation faces in giving attention to the well-being of others, 
and the fact that deliberation on what we should desire is just as important to a good 
society as the satisfaction of whatever desires we may have already been habituated to 
feel by circumstances.  
 
Essays published in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams’ collection, Utilitarianism 
and Beyond developed this critique more than twenty years ago.12 For example, in his 
contribution Stuart Hampshire argued that, while ‘stripped-down’ concepts of the 
good - like the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’, or prescriptions of just and 
moral actions that conform to universalist norms - were valid for the universalist 
sphere of ethics, they were inadequate to spheres of life which were necessarily more 
culturally specific. He argued that people were unavoidably born ‘into both a natural 
order and a cultural order’ … ‘sexuality, old age, death, family and friendship are 
among the natural phenomena which have to be moralised by conventions and 
customs, within one culture or another, and that means within a very particular and 
specific set of moral requirements’ (p156). The problem with equating all judgements 
with the criterion of utility is that self-interest becomes the primary ground of all 
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choices, with the social consequences for our form of life that we have been 
describing. Charles Taylor, in the same collection, argues that the language of utility 
is in itself limited, since it takes out of the field of consideration choices that moral 
agents need to make about specific and not necessarily compatible virtues. The 
‘qualitative’ questions about what it is to be a good soldier, scientist, therapist, friend 
or parent, and the language in which we try to answer such questions, are as relevant 
to ethics as the ‘quantitative’ norm that all should be considered as having an equal 
moral claim. Taylor’s view of a good society requires that we be able to reflect on and 
make choices about, the range of goods to which people can aspire, and their relation 
to each other. Ethical perspectives of a ‘social’ kind, which attach importance to 
relationships, respect, recognition, and creativity as key elements of a good society, 
are likely to find this neo-Aristotelian conception of ‘happiness as human flourishing’ 
more congenial than the utilitarian idea of the maximisation of satisfactions.  
 
There seem to be considerable difficulties in supplanting the one-dimensional goal of 
economic growth and rising incomes with more multi-dimensional conceptions of 
well-being. These difficulties have two main sources. One arises from the norms of 
our economic system, within which it seems compelling to equate greater purchasing 
power with more choice and opportunity for individuals. (The ‘external 
diseconomies’ and unintended consequences that might undermine the value of such 
choices are not always easily recognised, as we have seen.) Even when the 
importance of public goods, requiring collective decisions, is fully recognised, the 
assumption is understandably made that if gross national product were higher, there 
would then be more disposable resources to devote to such goods: there may seem to 
be no contradiction between the goal of greater economic growth, and the 
advancement of other social goods.13 The default position of our individualised and 
marketised system is that private goods should come first, while public and social 
goods follow only as a derogation from them. It is not recognised that this assumption 
embodies a choice of values too.  
 
The second problem derives from our highly centralised political system. Parties and 
governments are obliged by the necessity to win electoral support to formulate clear 
and intelligible objectives and policies which will further them. Complex goals and 
goods are unavoidably simplified and aggregated in this process. The achievement of 
an acceptable rate of economic growth in these circumstances is a compellingly 
simple criterion of governmental success. There is simply not much space, in a 
centralised system of government, in which the populace is in fact empowered to 
make few effective choices, for the diversification of goals and political negotiation 
about them. Furthermore, governments and politicians in a highly centralised system 
seem to be overwhelmed by complexity, and to need to simplify in order to retain the 
semblance of control. Society, in the information theorists’ language, has a greater 
‘variety’ than the political system that has to govern and regulate it. If we want a 
greater diversity of goods to be recognised and furthered, we will need a greater 
diversity of deliberative settings in which goals can be formulated and contested. In 
other words, if we want to see a more differentiated vocabulary of public goods and 
choices, we need a more devolved and participatory political system. In this respect, 
small is beautiful.  
 
Richard Layard’s programme for mental health 
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Richard Layard has been making use of Benthamite philosophical ideas - of which he 
is an avowed admirer - to advocate a more socially responsible public policy. He 
argues that it is not only analysis of external diseconomies and the unintended 
consequences of economic behaviour that argue the need for major interventions in 
market arrangements; scientific measures, including empirical studies of people’s 
reports of their own happiness, and neuroscientific studies of its correlates of 
happiness in brain-function also lend support to this view.14 Layard defends giving 
priority to public goods, and to greater equality and job security through the tax 
system; and he prefers the Continental European model of higher taxation, greater 
equality, and more universal social entitlement, to the free market model of the USA. 
He is a committed, if moderate, social democrat, and has been an effective advocate 
of full employment policies. In his book he advocates a considerable range of 
governmental interventions (for example welfare-to-work, compulsory parenting 
classes, and a considerable expansion in mental health services) to advance the 
general happiness - of the kind to which the present government, to which Layard has 
been an adviser, has shown some commitment.  
 
Given that Layard questions the links between economic growth and the general 
happiness, and seems to be willing to trade a slower rate of growth for qualitative 
benefits in well-being, does this argument about philosophical frameworks really 
matter? Is there anything wrong with ‘happiness’, as defined by utilitarians, or not?  
 
Layard’s philosophical assumptions do make some difficulties for his argument. He is 
an advocate, like Bentham, of universalism, of the principle of the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number, rightly pointing out that the great virtue of this principle is that 
it assigns equal moral weight to all individuals. But it is one thing to assert this as a 
universal moral principle, another to explain why individuals might choose to care 
about the well-being of others as much as they care about their own. Layard’s efforts 
to reconcile the motivational principle of self-interest, basic to liberal economic 
theory, with the principle of altruism which he ethically prefers, are not convincing. 
He explains the greed and short-sightedness regarding interests displayed by citizens 
in our market society as an evolutionary hangover from hunter-gatherer times when, 
in Hobbes’s terms, life was ‘nasty, brutish and short’. He says there is no reason why 
we should remain ‘enslaved’ by this genetic inheritance. But if selfishness really is 
our genetic inheritance (which it isn’t in this simple way), modifying human 
behaviour is going to be more of a problem than Layard supposes.  
 
Indeed evolving a shared conception of the common good is a generic problem for 
societies based on market principles. This is a central issue which the debate about 
‘happiness’ identifies. How does one get from a motivational theory based on 
individual self-interest, to some broader idea of the good society? The fact (which 
Layard and others draw attention to) that the increase in average incomes which the 
market can generate does not seem to produce a corresponding increase of the general 
happiness arises precisely from basing the organisation of society on this conception 
of human nature. Bentham hoped that this contradiction could be resolved through the 
power of the state, through legislation. He thought that if the appropriate rewards and 
sanctions were set in place, individual self-interest and the general happiness could be 
reconciled. Some of New Labour’s frenetic attempts to regulate behaviour, to 
encourage or constrain people to engage with the incentives of the market economy, 
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can be understood as a renewal of this utilitarian programme, and as a way of 
resolving this inherent contradiction within market societies.  
 
The shallowness of a psychological model which has been extrapolated from the 
discipline of economics is further revealed in Layard’s discussion of the problems of 
mental illness and depression. He has demonstrated powerful social reasons why 
individuals might be more anxious and depressed in increasingly insecure, 
consumption-dominated societies. It seems logical to conclude therefore that mental 
illness is most likely to diminish when these social factors are addressed. One might 
think that Layard’s concern about the high incidence of depression in our society 
would give some urgency to his arguments with the market. But in fact, he has chosen 
to give his main political priority to an intervention in the field of mental health: he is 
an advocate of the large-scale provision of cognitive behaviour therapy. In his view, 
CBT is the proven cure for 60 per cent of clinically depressed patients, and at a very 
limited cost - only £750 per patient - thus ensuring a favourable cost-benefit ratio 
even in economic terms.15 If only things were so simple!  
 
This recommendation draws also on Layard’s belief in what he calls ‘positive 
psychology’, the need for and possibility of ridding the mind of negative thoughts, 
and replacing them with positive ones, through various methods of self-reflection - 
which include both CBT and Buddhist meditation. These sections of Layard’s book 
seem rather naive, and poorly connected with his major social argument. Here is a 
whole society, in his view, where individuals feel so rivalrous that their own sense of 
well-being is impoverished by knowledge of others’ good, but in which a short course 
of positive thinking could cure most of the clinically depressed! Although he is 
critical of the earlier take-over of economic thinking by the psychological 
assumptions of behaviourism, his own psychological framework seems only slightly 
more sophisticated than this. Elsewhere, Layard, who is generally hostile to 
psychoanalysis, acknowledges (citing Freud) the great importance of early family 
experiences (as well as genetic inheritance) in forming personalities, and attaches 
importance to supportive relationships within families. Why would one suppose, 
given this, and the ‘situational rationality’ of anxiety and depression in the social 
conditions which Layard describes, that mass provision of a psychological technique 
designed to induce positive thinking is likely to match up to this serious problem? It 
would seem more to the point to address the fundamental problems of family 
relationships and economic security. In fact Layard’s passages on ‘positive thinking’ 
remind one of nothing so much as Samuel Smiles’s advocacy of self-help and its 
many equivalents in popular psychological literature. 
 
The idea of giving greater priority to mental health services is of course welcome, and 
without doubt CBT has a useful role in such services. But the emphasis which Layard 
gives to these recommendations over all others seems to me the equivalent of 
attempting to remedy a high incidence of traffic accidents by providing more garages 
for the repair of cars, and more A&E Departments for the repair of their drivers and 
passengers, instead of addressing the reasons why so many vehicles are causing 
deaths and injuries in the first place. In this his approach seems similar to many other 
‘New Labour’ policy interventions; while sometimes well-intentioned in themselves, 
they frequently serve to distract our attention from the ‘main line’ of pro-market 
policies that are exacerbating the deep problems which such ‘micro-solutions’ attempt 
to cure. 
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This article is an edited version of a talk given at a Tavistock Clinic Policy Seminar in 
March 2007. Comments welcome at m.j.rustin@uel.ac.uk. 
 
 
1. In societies which have not yet escaped from mass poverty, economic growth 
and well-being are closely connected. For more on these debates see, for example, 
L. Bruni and P.L. Porta (eds), Economics and Happiness, Oxford University Press 
2005; Oliver James, Affluenza, Vermilion 2007; Robert E. Lane, The Loss of 
Happiness in Market Democracies, Yale University Press 2000; Richard Layard, 
Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, Penguin 2005; Avner Offer, The 
Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950, Oxford University Press 2006; The Economist, ‘Happiness and 
how to measure it’, 23.12.06-5.1.07. 
2. Data is provided by Layard (in Happiness) and Offer (The Challenge of 
Affluence). For example, crime levels increased threefold in the period from 1950 
to 1980, though the increase has now levelled off. Half of all American children 
are living with only one parent by the age of 14. Three times more young people 
received psychotropic medication in 1997 than in 1987; anxiety scores among 
children have increased such that the average child of the 1990s would in the 
1950s have been deemed in need of professional attention. 
3. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press 1944. 
4. Arlie Russell Hochschild (in B. Ehrenreich and A. Hochschild (eds), Global 
Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex-Workers in the New Economy, Granta 2002) has 
written eloquently about the global economy of child care, in which women from 
poor countries like the Philippines go to rich countries like the US to care for the 
children of American working parents, whilst their own children are cared for at 
home by grandparents. An income stream is repatriated back home, but the core 
process is the removal of women from the sphere of non-monetary work with their 
own children, which is thereby depleted, to take part in a marketised exchange in 
the rich world. One can see why these choices get made, on all sides, but if 
inequalities were less, the Philippino women would stay at home with their own 
children. 
5. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism Socialism and Democracy, Allen and Unwin 1943. 
6. ‘We see how in this way the mode of production and the means of production 
are continually transformed, revolutionised, how the division of labour is 
necessarily followed by still greater division of labour, the application of 
machinery by still greater application of machinery, work on a large scale by work 
on a still larger scale. That is the law which again and again throws bourgeois 
production out of its old course and which compels capital to intensify the 
productive forces of labour, because it has intensified them, it, the law which 
gives capital no rest and continually whispers in its ear, go on, go on…’, Wage 
Labour and Capital, Chapter 5. 
7. Marx’s prognoses for a communist future, and his political conception of how 
to arrive at it, had many limitations, his analysis of the expansive and 
transformative power of capitalism was remarkably prescient.  On this argument, 
see Meghnad Desai, Marx’s Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism and the 
Death of Statist Socialism, Verso 2002. 
8. My argument here gives more emphasis to the institutional power of capitalism 
and its institutions than most of the writers I cite, who tend to focus their 
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explanations on unintended consequences, external diseconomies, and misguided 
or myopic motivations.  
9. One of the traps inherent in the choice of economic growth as a summative goal 
is to see it as the precondition of all other goals. Thus, if we have greater wealth 
we can then decide whether to spend it in this or that way. But this neglects the 
reality that the pursuit of economic growth involves the sacrifice of other goals in 
its pursuit, and in any case tends to genuine mentalities in which ‘private’ goods 
are seen as entitlements, and public ones merely as entailing losses, rather than 
gains, in private benefit. 
10. See Amartya Sen, Development and Freedom, Oxford University Press 1999; 
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, Cambridge University Press 2001. 
11. Sen holds that the conjunction of markets to organise distribution, with 
a democratic political framework, has been the most effective means of 
alleviating famines where these have occurred, India since Independence 
having been more successful in this respect than it was before under the 
Raj, or than China has been within the same period. 
12. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond, 
Cambridge University Press 1982. 
13. Social democrats like Anthony Crosland thought that economic growth 
was the key to the advancement of socialist goals like greater quality and 
more public goods, since it would be much easier to find resources for 
such goods from economic surpluses than from redistribution of existing 
income and wealth. 
14. He has a discussion of the location of positive emotions in the right forebrain, 
and negative emotions in the left, which seems extraordinarily simplistic. 
15. There may be an affinity between the priority given by Layard to a 
large-scale cognitive behaviour therapy programme, and his and New 
Labour’s continuing commitment to ‘welfare to work’, since plainly 
depression must be significantly related to long-term unemployment or 
incapacity, both as its effect and as its cause (for more on governmental 
attitudes to incapacity benefit see Jonathan Rutherford in this issue). In the 
Reform of the Poor Law of 1834, the earlier utilitarians sought to enforce 
participation in the labour force through economic constraints and the end 
of unconditional assistance. Now, in this more psychological age, the will 
to participate needs to be addressed also, and depression undermines the 
will. Utilitarianism has long been aligned with what Foucauldians refer to 
as governmentality - with regimes of social power. 
 
